

A Symbolic Interpretation of the Lines of Effort through the Theory of Strategic Ambiguity

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT The Army conducts operations in complex environments with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners. Doctrine provides several concepts designed to create and sustain effective partnerships. One of these concepts, the Lines of Effort (LOE), has been viewed as a method of long term visualization but is undervalued as an organizing tool. This monograph examines how LOE can effectively assist operational commanders in achieving unity of effort with multiple JIIM partners in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Two contemporary Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) case studies, 1 st Cavalry Division in OIF II and Multinational Force-Iraq during the "New Way Forward," were analyzed against criteria that assessed if LOE were used as a symbol of strategy to promote unified diversity and facilitate organizational change. In both cases, each commander utilized LOE as a symbol to represent their vision of the operation, and the LOE subsequently became a symbol of orientation for the organization. In turn, this allowed for multiple interpretations among JIIM partners and created unified diversity. The LOE's effectiveness as an organizing tool became apparent when used in the planning and execution process by allowing organizational adaptation.					
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Abstract

A SYMBOLIC INTERPRETATION OF THE LINES OF EFFORT THROUGH THE THEORY OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY by Major Daniel H. Edwan, US Army, 62 pages.

The Army conducts operations in complex environments with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners. Doctrine provides several concepts designed to create and sustain effective partnerships. One of these concepts, the Lines of Effort (LOE), has been viewed as a method of long term visualization but is undervalued as an organizing tool. This monograph examines how LOE can effectively assist operational commanders in achieving unity of effort with multiple JIIM partners in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

The analytical framework is based on Eric Eisenberg's theory of strategic ambiguity, which contends that leaders utilize ambiguity to achieve organizational goals. Two contemporary Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) case studies, 1st Calvary Division in OIF II and Multinational Force-Iraq during the "New Way Forward," were analyzed against criteria that assessed if LOE were used as a symbol of strategy to promote unified diversity and facilitate organizational change.

Numerous conclusions resulted from the analysis. In both cases, the LOE contributed to the successful incorporation of numerous JIIM partners. Each commander utilized LOE as a symbol to represent their vision of the operation, and the LOE subsequently became a symbol of orientation for the organization. In turn, this allowed for multiple interpretations among JIIM partners and created unified diversity. The LOE's effectiveness as an organizing tool became apparent when used in the planning and execution process by allowing organizational adaptation. Ambiguity of LOE when paired with a change in purpose facilitated organizational change. When used by a commander in a symbolic manner, LOE allowed for diverse interpretations by JIIM partners attributing to unity of effort. Based upon this integrated conclusion, this monograph makes the following recommendations. The inherent ambiguity of LOE as represented in doctrine should be retained, and the Army should revise the role of the LOE from an element of operational design to a formal planning concept. Lastly, given the competing definitions and descriptions of LOE across doctrine, a more formal effort should be undertaken to create a common doctrinal framework with habitual partners.

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Introduction

In a 2007 speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided a list of challenges in the complex military operational environment and observed, “one of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success.”¹ At the *Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)* inaugural conference, Dr. Janine Davidson proposed solving these challenges using “an integrated, whole of government approach that allows multiple actors from a myriad of agencies and organizations to apply distinct skill sets toward a common objective.”² The 2008 releases of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, provided several frameworks, models, and concepts to assist U.S. Army operational commanders build organizations to meet the challenges of complex environments as part of diverse partnerships called the unified action environment— Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM). One of these concepts, the Lines of Effort (LOE), has been viewed as a method of long term visualization and undervalued as an organizing tool. This view is not apparent in the LOE’s doctrinal base, but prevalent in academic studies.

The current body of knowledge on LOE consists of three themes.³ First, each examination of LOE placed it in the role of a planning tool. This is in contrast to its primary doctrinal role as an element of operational design. Elements of operational design “help commanders understand, visualize, and describe complex combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance.”⁴

¹ Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture Series” (lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 2007), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (accessed October 15, 2009).

² Dr. Janine Davidson, “Toward Unity of Effort: The What, Why, and How of the CCO” (lecture, Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2008).

³ Studies regarding the theory of the LOE are extremely limited. This monograph reviews available LOE theoretical works and uses of the concept as an analytical framework.

⁴ Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington: GPO, February 2008), 6-6.

Fundamentally, this limits the role of LOE to a doctrinal concept that informs—but is outside of—the formal planning process. This explains its exclusion from the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Second, each study attempts to clarify perceived sources of confusion between Lines of Operation (LOO) and LOE. Third, each academic study lacks empirical evidence to prove causal linkages. These studies placed LOE in a planning role and the authors attempted to measure effectiveness of LOE on the environment. This monograph takes an opposite approach and examines the LOE from the operational commander’s perspective in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

This purpose of this monograph is to determine how effectively the LOE assists operational commanders achieve unity of effort with multiple JIIM partners in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Answering this question will address what recommended changes are needed to improve the LOE concept’s effectiveness. LOE are analyzed to determine effectiveness as an organizing tool. This approach allows for a direct analysis of unity of effort defined as, “the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.”⁵ This monograph contends LOE in its current doctrinal form effectively creates a necessary ambiguity that facilitates unity of effort for JIIM operations in a COIN environment.

Methodology and Organization

The primary method used to analyze the research question and determine the validity of the hypothesis is case study analysis. The analysis occurs through a constructed analytical framework based on Eric Eisenberg’s theory of strategic ambiguity, which contends that leaders utilize ambiguity to achieve organizational goals. This theory is based heavily on organization theory and to a lesser degree

⁵ Ibid., Glossary-10.

communications theory. The organizational aspects provide the criteria for analysis. A review of literature provides doctrinal definitions and descriptions of LOE and an assessment of previous LOE studies. This is followed by an extensive development of the analytical approach and framework. The first case study, the 1st Cavalry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, focuses on the development of the Task Force Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan. The second case study focuses on Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during the period of “The New Way Forward” in 2007-2008. Analysis using the theory of strategic ambiguity immediately follows each case study. Recommendations are made based on this analysis.

Scope

This study examines LOE from the organizational point of view to determine unity of effort by evaluating cooperation, coordination, and unified action. In both case studies, the operation’s outcome is analyzed in the context of interaction between U.S. Army organizations and JIIM partners. This study relies solely on unclassified data. The amount of open source material proved adequate for this study. However, time will increase the capability to conduct more extensive studies as additional information is declassified and made publicly available. This study is part of a larger study regarding the effectiveness of the military’s ‘whole of government’ and ‘comprehensive’ approaches.

Literature Review

The Lines of Effort as a military doctrinal concept have direct links to the doctrine of Battle Command and unified action as well as informal links to Joint and U.S. Army operations processes specifically planning. Although the LOE concept evolved from the LOO concept, they are distinct.⁶ LOE are conceptual while LOO are physical. Military theorists Henry Lloyd (1720-1783) and Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow (1757-1807) developed LOO as a method to maintain a geographic orientation of

⁶ Dr. Jack Kem, *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*, 2nd ed. (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College Press, 2006), 31-33.

forces toward a single principle. The original LOO concept was that “an undivided army, moving on a single line of operations kept as short and safe as possible, can hope to avoid defeat.”⁷ Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869), one of the most insightful military theorists, shaped and defined LOO as a broader set of fixed principles. His views still shape doctrine today. Jomini, influenced by a scientific approach to warfare, viewed the linear contiguous battlefield through a geometric lens. In *The Art of War*, Jomini stated that “In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base.”⁸ Based upon his first hand knowledge of Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaigns, he further developed the concept by defining ‘interior lines’ and ‘exterior lines’ (See figure 1).⁹

The extension of this concept began with the Army’s development of operational art in the 1986 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*. Specifically, LOO evolved alongside other doctrinal concepts such as center of gravity (COG) and decision points in the Gulf War.¹⁰

⁷ John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 149.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 6-12.

¹⁰ Mario Diaz, “Prosperity or Perdition: Do Lines of Operations Apply in Stability Operations?” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), 13.




Figure 1. The Jominian concept of lines of operation.¹¹

Since its entry into doctrine, LOE have been paired with LOO in Army doctrine as one element of operational design (see figure 2). The commander's determination of which concept to use in operational design is based on the relationship between his forces and enemy forces. The "lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance."¹² In direct contrast, the use of LOO is applicable for "lines that tie offensive and defensive tasks to the geographic and positional references in the operational area."¹³ This suggests a mutually exclusive relationship between LOE and LOO. Differentiation between both concepts remains a source of confusion within a majority of the academic works. Part of the confusion over terms lies within the origins of LOE.

¹¹ Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington: GPO, June 2001), 5-8.

¹² FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 6-12.




Figure 2. The elements of operational design.¹⁴

U.S. Army doctrine first codified LOE as the logical lines of operation (LLO) in the 2001 release of FM 3-0, *Operations*. As expressed in this field manual, the LLO provides a framework for visualizing how military capabilities can support unified action, in which “commanders link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose-cause and effect.”¹⁵ The manual’s introduction of the concept was sparse and clearly written as a contingency to the LOO.¹⁶ The popularity of the concept from 2001 to 2006 is difficult to judge, other than a few notable instances during OIF attributed to General Tommy Franks, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander, Major General David Petraeus, 101st Division Commander, and Major General Peter Chiarelli, 1st Cavalry Division Commander.¹⁷

The use of the LLO by Petraeus and Chiarelli are featured in the case studies, discussed later. Their use of the concept prior to 2006 had an impact on Army doctrine. It shaped the development of

¹⁴ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-7.

¹⁵ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2001, 5-37.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5-37. The manual dedicated one paragraph and a rudimentary accompanying diagram of three lines that create military conditions.

¹⁷ Kem, *Campaign Planning*, 35. “In the early stages of planning for OIF, General Tommy Franks developed the concept of lines and slices to visualize the campaign based on a policy goal to remove Saddam Hussein from power.” This is one of the earliest published uses of the LOE in contemporary operations.

LLO with the release of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.¹⁸ Field Manual 3-24, published in December 2006, developed the LLO from a secondary concept to an extensive framework for practitioners in a COIN environment. The most significant example is the manual's development of six LLOs in which each line was explained as well as their interdependency. The manual's definition of the LLO remained in line with FM 3-0, but the description of the concept was significantly different, "LLOs can also be described as an operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose."¹⁹ Although Field Manual 3-24's contribution to the concept was significant, its complete avoidance of the LOO, its conflict specificity, and declaration of the concept as a planning construct, did not change the role of the LLO from an element of operational design in the release of the new FM 3-0 fourteen months later.

The 2008 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, renamed LLO as LOE but retained the wording of the original FM 3-0 definition. It defined a Line of Effort, as "a line that links multiple tasks and mission using the logic of purpose-cause and effect-to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions."²⁰ An accompanying figure in FM 3-0 provided an example (see Figure 3). Even though the

¹⁸ David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 148. This book provides evidence of Petraeus' impact on Chiarelli. While Chiarelli's was preparing for 1st CD's mission in Baghdad during OIF II (2004), "He had read as many books as he could find about counterinsurgency, talked at length with the commander of the outgoing division about Baghdad, and carefully studied what Dave Petraeus had done in Mosul. Petraeus' model was a starting point." Model as discussed here is logically deduced as his use of the LOE due to the multiple non-lethal partners the authors describe Chiarelli is framing his thoughts from. In FM 3-24, Chiarelli is featured as a source of contemporary experience in the annotated bibliography.

¹⁹ Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington: GPO, December 2006), 1-7.

²⁰ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13. A critical point in Army doctrine is that FM 3-0 is the capstone publication that provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. Therefore, new releases of the FM 3-0 address inconsistencies from previous manuals.

definitions between the FM 3-0 (2001), FM 3-24, and FM 3-0, (2008) versions remained relatively the same, the description of the concept continued to expand.²¹




Figure 3. The Lines of Effort²²

The 2008 version of FM 3-0 addressed the specific COIN focus and discrepancies with FM 3-24's depiction of the LLO, by linking LOO and LOE in the context of full spectrum operations.

Commanders use both lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. Combining lines of operations and lines of effort allows commanders to include nonmilitary activities in their operational design. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks that set the end state conditions into the operation. It allows commanders to consider the less tangible aspects of the operational environment where the other instruments of national power dominate. Commanders can then visualize concurrent and post-conflict stability activities. Making these connections relates the tasks and purposes of the elements of full spectrum operations with joint effects identified in the campaign plan. The resulting operational design effectively combines full spectrum operations throughout the campaign or major operation.²³

²¹ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2001, 5-37; FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13.

²² FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-14.

²³ *Ibid.*, 14.

Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, released eight months after the 2008 version of FM 3-0, modified the definition by excluding the phrase cause and effect. Field Manual 3-07 defined the LOE as a line that “links multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state.”²⁴ This is significant in the evolution of the concept in that the logic of constructing the LOE is not predicated on the depiction of causal chains. This, and the lack of a doctrinal method for creating LOE, allows practitioners more flexibility in using LOE.

A common theme in the progression of doctrine portrays LOE in a linear manner. As shown in Figure 3, the drawing graphically portrays multiple lines, each with multiple actions that flow to the point of an encompassing arrow. At this point, the cumulative effects of all lines create the desired end state.²⁵ The evolution of the description and uses of LOE has been significant within doctrine, but its role as an element of operational design was reaffirmed in the publication of the FM 3-0, *Operations*, in 2008. The LOE’s definition has been broadened significantly creating additional flexibility in its construction. More importantly, its use as a commander’s visualization tool of a military operation integrating the actions of other elements of national power exemplifies its potential as an organizing tool.

Currently, the only non-doctrinal book that addresses the theory of LOE is Dr. Jack Kem’s *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*. Released in June 2006, six months before the release of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Kem provided a concise handbook of doctrinal campaign planning tools for students of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Kem, through an assessment of the various Joint and Army doctrinal manuals, explored the COG element of operational design.²⁶ The COG served as his central concept with the notable exception of his chapter on the LLO. His extensive

²⁴ Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington: GPO, October 2008), 4-9.

²⁵ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, Glossary-6. This manual in line with Joint Doctrine defines ‘end state’ as “the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.”

²⁶ Kem, *Campaign Planning*, 31-33.

development of the LLO as a planning construct defined the concept as it would be portrayed in FM 3-24. Kem's examination established the differences between the LOO and LLO in which he concluded the LLO "should be considered for all campaigns."²⁷ He supported this claim with an analysis and interpretation of excerpts of the 2001 version of FM 3-0, NATO doctrine, and examples of the LLO from OIF. Kem provided his revised definition of the LOE.

The logical line of operation is a cognitive operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose. The actions and objectives in a logical line of operation depict causal relationships that are both linear and nonlinear. Operational objectives are depicted along a logical line of operation; the same operational objective may be depicted along more than one logical line of operation. All logical lines of operation should lead to the COG.²⁸

Nonlinearity and unity of purpose were key elements of his definition that are repeated in FM 3-24. Kem's depiction of the LLO as an assessment tool also appeared in the manual.²⁹ Kem's work advanced the concept as an insightful framework for COIN operations. His most significant and original insight comes from his contention that the LLO are valuable in wargaming and rehearsals. Kem stated the LLO "allows you to consider actions in the entire theater," forcing the staff to consider the aspects of the operation beyond the comfort zone of offense and defense.³⁰ Although *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade* provided significant depth to the LLO, it did not address the concept in the context of JIIM partners.

The importance of multiple partners in military operations was the primary consideration in books that incorporated LOE as a conceptual tool. Numerous contributing authors in *The Quest for Viable*

²⁷ Kem, *Campaign Planning*, 32.

²⁸ Ibid., 34-35.

²⁹ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 5-2. This manual depicts the LOE as a tool that unifies efforts toward a common purpose. Figure 5-3, depicts the nonlinearity of the LOE with the depiction of a rope. On page 5-26, the manual states that objectives along the LOE provide a method to determine measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP).

³⁰ Kem, *Campaign Planning*, 40.

Peace utilized the LOE as a comprehensive strategy framework. The book used the context of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1999-2002 as the case study for analysis. The chapters followed a common methodology, which began with a contextual analysis against four proposed strategies to “stabilize a society ravaged by internal conflict.”³¹ This was followed by an analysis of the interdependencies of the strategies arranged in the LOE. “Each strategy interlocks with the others to provide the dynamism and momentum needed to erode the power of violence-prone forces and propel the transformation process toward viable peace.”³² This methodology developed the LOE as both an analysis and synthesis tool to examine numerous aspects of a military operation holistically. The work’s main conclusion was the creation of an integrated political strategy, composed of five derived LOE, as a basis for political-military planning in peace intervention operations. A recent book on Irregular Warfare (IW) applied the LOE in a similar manner.

In 2008, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) commissioned a Rand Corporation study to better understand the intelligence analytic requirements of IW for intelligence. *Assessing Irregular Warfare, A Framework for Intelligence Analysis*, utilized the standard LLOs from FM 3-24 as a secondary analytical framework to determine a list of intelligence requirements in the context of an IW environment.³³ The use of LOE/LLO as a conceptual framework for analysis and synthesis has shown its applicability in academic works about warfare. This suggests a broader aspect of the LOE. It is a practical method for the study of warfare in multiple operational environments.

³¹ Richard H. Solomon, “Foreword,” in *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), xi.

³² *Ibid.*, xii.

³³ Derek Eaton et al., *Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), 4-15.

Articles on LOE are limited both in number and in scope. There are two consistent themes concerning the concept; clarification and application as a planning tool. Milan Vego in “The Problem of Common Terminology” conducted an extensive Joint and Army doctrinal terminology study.³⁴ Vego’s analysis of the Joint and Army doctrinal definitions and descriptions of LOO and LOE was extensive, but largely semantic. The results of analysis provided a comprehensive list of the inconsistencies in the body of doctrine. Vego’s work served as a critical literature review of the concepts prior to the release of FM 3-24. Two years later, Major General Walter Wojdakowski, Commandant of the Infantry School, clarified LOE in the context of a COIN environment.³⁵ Wojdakowski focused directly on the Army commander’s responsibility to translate the content of the LOE into tactical combat orders. He stated “our soldiers need to know why they are conducting non-lethal operations and how their efforts are tied to the bigger picture.”³⁶ This article is significant in that it describes LOE as a concept that allows the organization to create unity of effort.

Planning approaches to LOE have been formulated from a variety of authors. In 2007, at the 12th International Command and Control Research Technology Symposium, Alexander Kott and others, presented an extensive LOE centric approach that entirely restructured the current Joint doctrinal planning process. The approach was founded on the idea of military and intergovernmental partners at the operational level planning and executing along a template of standard LOE.³⁷ A similar approach to standard LOE can be found in the Australian Army’s *Adaptive Campaigning- Future Land Operating*

³⁴ Milan N. Vego, “The Problem of Common Terminology,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 43 (4th Quarter 2006): 44-46.

³⁵ Walter Wojdakowski, “Counterinsurgency—Seizing the Initiative,” *Infantry* 97, no. 4 (July-August 2008): 1-2.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Alexander Kott et al. “Next State Planning: A ‘Whole of Government’ Approach for Planning and Executing Operational Campaigns” (paper presented at the 12th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, , Newport, RI, 19-21 June 2007).

Concept. The main precept of the theory is “the orchestration of a whole-of-government effort across five interdependent and mutually reinforcing conceptual lines of operation [LOE by Army doctrine].”³⁸ Unlike the Kott approach, however, they are not prescriptive.

Another LOE approach to planning was presented by Major Glenn Henke in “Planning Full Spectrum Operations: Implications of FM 3-0 on Planning Doctrine.”³⁹ Henke proposed abandoning the phasing construct prevalent in Joint and Army doctrine for a LOE-based paradigm. “Instead of breaking the operation into phases, we visualize the entire operation along lines.”⁴⁰ Similar to the Australian Army perspective, Henke emphasized the interdependency of each line as the defining aspect of the LOE. LOE approaches to clarification and planning are also prevalent in more formal academic studies.

Major Mario Diaz conducted a comprehensive study of the LOE after the 2001 release of FM 3-0, *Operations*. His monograph, “Prosperity or Perdition: Do Lines of Operations Apply in Stability Operations?,” challenged the applicability of LOO and LLO in the context of a complex operational environment. Diaz stated that both concepts were simplistic products of linear thinking with diminished applicability in hyper-complex operations that required the use of other methods rooted in complexity theory and non-linear thinking.⁴¹ Diaz analyzed a hypothetical Columbian case study using LOE and a complex system based model in order to support his argument. The results of his analysis confirmed that a complex system based model was more effective in a hyper-complex environment. His conclusions and

³⁸ “Adaptive Campaigning-Future Land Operating Concept,” *Vanguard, Leading from the Front* 4 (September 2009): 1-2. The use of Lines of Operation means Lines of Effort in this context as shown by the theme of the five LOE. The five lines are: Joint Land Combat, Population Protection, Information Actions, Population Support, and Indigenous Capacity Building.

³⁹ Glenn A. Henke, “Planning Full Spectrum Operations: Implications of FM 3-0 on Planning Doctrine,” *Military Review* (November-December 2008): 97-101.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Diaz, “Prosperity or Perdition,” 3. Hyper-complex is a pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom reference to a specific type of stability operation characterized by civil conflict among a nation with an unstable government.

recommendations supported the retention of both the LOO and LOE in doctrine with modifications to the figures that included representation of interdependencies between the lines.

Diaz's application of complexity and non-linear thinking was a significant step in the study of the LOE. Although the Columbian case study lacked empirical data, the monograph provides a usable framework for a future study of LOE effectiveness. The most relevant contributions of Diaz's study are the dialogue regarding the role of LOE as an element of operational design and the implied relationship between LOE and unity of effort. Diaz specifically positioned his argument in the context of a larger discussion regarding the utility of all of the elements of operational design. Throughout the monograph, Diaz utilized the LOO and LOE as a formal planning concept while later recognizing that as an element of operational design it serves as a linkage to the vision of the commander.

In 2006, Major Matthew Cody's monograph, "Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN," examined the origin and application of the LLO in a COIN environment. The emphasis of his work is on the LLO as a planning and decision making tool. He contended that concept is inadequately defined in doctrine. The purpose of his study was to demonstrate LOE as the preeminent doctrinal long term planning method at the operational level. His cursory explanation of the LOE's origin identified the concept as a direct descendant from Jomini's LOO, but did not identify the context surrounding its entry into doctrine.⁴² Cody did contend that LOE are "more useful in the complexity of the COE [Contemporary Operating Environment] while physical lines of operation retain more utility in conventional conflict."⁴³ He highlighted the relationship between LOE and LOO as a significant element

⁴² Matthew Cody, "Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN" (master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006), 24-28. It can be implied from his later statements that the LOE were codified in doctrine as an accompaniment to the introduction of the complex operating environment (COE) in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*.

⁴³ Ibid., 27.

of confusion and recommended a simple name change to ‘civil’ and ‘military’ lines of operation respectively.

Cody’s case study analysis of the British in Malaya and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division in OIF provided both a historical and contemporary use of the LOE as a planning concept in which the respective commanders in these COIN operations made decisions. The results of the case studies are inconsequential with respect to the effectiveness of LOE as a planning and decision making tool. The empirical data provided did not substantiate a link between the LOE and decision making. As a result, this limited Cody’s claim to a simplified deduction that the LOE have been successfully used as a planning tool that commanders may use to make decisions in a COIN environment.⁴⁴

The significance of Cody’s monograph is the additional depth he provided on the doctrinal assessment that articulated the role of LOE as an element of operational design and not as a prescribed planning concept. Cody goes beyond Diaz in this respect in order to address the gaps between Army and Joint doctrinal definitions. He provided an additional level of analysis and additional perspective by comparing the concept with British doctrine. Cody as an outright advocate of the current doctrinal construct of LOE pointed out Diaz’s work as an excellent basis, but not a holistic departure from existing doctrine that required a new concept. Both of these works used the 2001 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*.

The 2008 releases of FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* renewed the study of the LOE. The most recent study of LOE comes from Lieutenant Commander Joseph Cooper’s 2008, “Including a Critical Path Method of Project Management to Assist the Planning and Tracking of Stability Operations.” Cooper again followed suit with previous studies and examined LOE as a planning method. Building upon Diaz’s initial attempts at applying a different model, he applied the Critical Path Method

⁴⁴ Cody, “Leveraging Logical Lines,” 64. This deduction supports his recommendation that the LOE “should be included early in the planning process and incorporated throughout the phasing construct from deterrence through major combat operations and transition.” However, there is little evidence to support the LOE supported decision making.

(CPM). Cooper differed from Diaz in that his premise was to add the CPM to the current LOE concept rather than replace it outright. Cooper's study reflected the first attempt at using empirical data in the LOE concept. Using the most recent information available on Iraq, he constructed the critical path of real world LOE. This data set came from one source and was limited to the campaign level. The intricate detail for the numerous objectives along the lines was extrapolated from various governmental and nongovernmental sources.⁴⁵ Cooper created a model and methodology that was extraordinarily complex and directly tied to assessments. The logic of his study suggests that a complex model such as CPM is best applied during execution when the objectives of LOE are being assessed.

The studies conducted prior to 2008 are important, but Cooper's work expanded the analysis of LOE in numerous ways. First, he presents a comprehensive explanation of the LOE definition, description and linkages to numerous unified action concepts capturing recent doctrinal changes. Second, Cooper's examination of the relationship between LOE and Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) was vital in determining the effectiveness of LOE in execution. Finally, the addition of the CPM to the LOE concept demonstrated that the LOE concept could progressively improve throughout the operations process (plan, prepare, execute and assess).

Since its doctrinal inception, the LOE have been defined as an element of operational design. Academic studies have examined its role in the planning process and have begun to examine its role in the execution process. The current base of knowledge on LOE is focused on its effect on the environment. Researchers have aimed at answering questions centered on the concept's effectiveness at achieving a desired end state. There are currently no studies that examine the effectiveness of LOE to form an organization, or achieve unity of effort. This is a fundamental shift in point of view that requires the use

⁴⁵ Joseph Cooper, "Including a Critical Path Method of Project Management to Assist the Planning and Tracking of Stability Operations" (master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2008), 30-64.

of theories outside of the Military Sciences. The extensive theoretical basis of organization theory provides numerous methods to analyze LOE effectiveness as an organizational tool.

Organization Theory

Organization theory is not bounded by a “single, integrated, overarching explanation for organizations and organizing.”⁴⁶ Organization theory from its onset has always embraced multiple perspectives “because it draws inspiration from a wide variety of other fields of study, and because organizations will remain too complex and malleable to ever be summed up by any single theory.”⁴⁷ There are four prevalent perspectives in organization theory: prehistory, modern, symbolic interpretive, and postmodern. The prehistory perspective draws from classical theorists such as Adam Smith (1776), Karl Marx (1867), and Max Weber (1924). An unintended derivative of their works provided organization theory with its formative concepts in which the modern, interpretive, and postmodern perspectives were founded. These three perspectives are further categorized by their ontological and epistemological differences.⁴⁸ Table 1 provides a summary of each perspective. The differences produce significant distinctions within each category, particularly within the definition of an organization. The symbolic interpretive emphasis on the social construction of an organization and the modernist desire to shape the organization for effectiveness has created a conceptual area of overlap in the role of symbols in organizational culture.

⁴⁶ Mary Jo Hatch and Ann Cunliffe, *Organization Theory, Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3-8.

Table 1. Summary of three perspectives of organization theory.⁴⁹

	Modernism/Functionalists	Symbolic Interpretive	Postmodernism
<i>Ontology</i>	Objective- observed, external reality	Subjective- existence is based on awareness of it.	The belief the world appears through language and is situated in discourse
<i>Epistemology</i>	Positivism- truth through valid conceptualization and reliable measurement	Interpretivism- all knowledge is relative to the knower, truth is socially constructed through multiple interpretations	Meanings cannot be fixed, no independent reality
<i>Definition of Organization</i>	Objectively real entities operating in a real world. When well-designed and managed they are systems of decision and action driven by norms of rationality, efficiency, and effectiveness for stated purposes	Continually constructed and reconstructed by their members through symbolically mediated interaction. Organizations are socially constructed realities where meanings promote and are promoted by understanding of the self and others that occurs within the organizational context.	Sites for enacting power relations, oppression, irrationality, communicative distortion. Organizations are texts produced by and in language.
<i>Focus of Organization Theory</i>	Finding universal laws, methods, and techniques of organization and control, rational structures, rules, standardized procedures and routine practices	Describe how people give meaning and order to their experience within specific contexts, through interpretive and symbolic acts, forms and processes	Deconstructing organizational texts, destabilizing managerial ideologies and modernist modes of organizing and theorizing.

The modernist and symbolic interpretive perspectives fundamentally disagree on the importance of organizational culture and the role of symbols. Modernists contend that symbols are “observable manifestations of culture, and as means to maintain social order.”⁵⁰ In contrast, the symbolic interpretive perspective has a general view that organizations are cultures comprised of shared symbols and meanings. As a result, symbols are “fundamental to the very existence of the organization.”⁵¹ A prominent interpretive theorist, Linda Smircich, in her 1983 *Administrative Science Quarterly* article, considered organizations as “socially sustained cognitive enterprises where thought and action are linked” by a

⁴⁹ Hatch and Cunliffe, *Organization Theory*, 14.

⁵⁰ Christiane Demers, *Organizational Change Theories: A Synthesis* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), 83.

⁵¹ Ibid.

variable pattern of beliefs, symbols, rituals, myths, and practices.⁵² Peter Frost, in *Organizational Culture* (1985), contended that culture is “talking about the importance for people of symbolism of rituals, myths, stories and legends and about the interpretation of events, ideas, and experiences.”⁵³ Joanne Martin and Debra Meyerson in “Culture Change: An Integration of Three Different Views” summarized their view as one in which symbols are the critical content of any organization’s culture.⁵⁴ This led to the growing contention among symbolic interpretive theorists, that an analysis of symbols, meanings, and cultural patterns of behavior provided a more useful understanding of cultural change.⁵⁵ This view was taken further by Dennis Gioia (1986) and Mary Jo Hatch (1993) who contended the use of a symbol’s shared meaning becomes a crucial aspect of organizational change.⁵⁶

Modernists opposed this view on the grounds that organizational culture is problematic and indeterminate; therefore, it cannot support an outright scientific solution. A symbolic approach does not seek scientific solution; it seeks to interpret meaning rather than scientific measurement. The solution to this dilemma for modernists is to shape the strategy to the organizational culture. The interpretive view is that culture can change strategy. Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy in their book, *Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life* (1982), stressed finding the link between an organization’s

⁵² Linda Smircich, “Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28 (September 1983): 353.

⁵³ Peter J. Frost et al., *Organizational Culture* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1985), 17.

⁵⁴ Joanne Martin and Debra Meyerson, “Culture Change: An Integration of Three Different Views,” *Journal of Management Studies* 24 (November 1987): 623-647.

⁵⁵ S.R. Barley and J.V. Van Maanen, “Cultural Organization: Fragments of a Theory,” in *Organizational Culture*, ed. Peter J. Frost (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 1985), 31-53.

⁵⁶ Demers, *Organizational Change Theories*, 84; Dennis A. Gioia, “Symbols, Scripts, and Sensemaking: Creating Meaning in the Organizational Experience,” in *In the Thinking Organization*, ed. Dennis Gioia and H.P. Sims, (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1986), 49-74; Mary Jo Hatch and D. Yanow, “Organizational Theory as an Interpretive Science,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory* ed. Christian Knudsen and Haridimos Tsoukas (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 63-87.

financial success and the extent to which organization members share core values.⁵⁷ John Kotter and James Heskett in their book, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (1992), found that culture and strategy are aligned when organizational culture supports adaptation.⁵⁸ Edgar Schien's series of modernist works served as a bridge between both perspectives. In *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (1999), Schein would justify the need for leaders to understand organizational culture.

Culture matters because it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life.⁵⁹

His view matured in the third edition of his book, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, where he asserted that "it is easy to observe *what* happens in organizations, an understanding of culture helps to explain *why* things happen. Further, understanding *how* leaders create culture and *how* culture defines and creates leaders, illuminates leadership—a critical variable in defining success or failure."⁶⁰

Analytical Approach

The importance of leaders, strategy, and symbols for organizational culture are common themes from both modernist and symbolic interpretive perspectives. The theoretical basis of this monograph builds from the symbolic interpretive perspective and key aspects of Schien's modernist view of organizational culture. This particular aspect of organizational theory provides focus on the internal logic that defines the organization's direction and applies meaning to the internal relationships of its members.

⁵⁷ Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, *Corporate cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life* (New York: Perseus Publishing, 1982), 232-240.

⁵⁸ James L. Heskett and John P. Kotter, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 10-31.

⁵⁹ Edgar Schien, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass INC, 1999), 17.

⁶⁰ Edgar Schien, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass INC, 2004), 3.

From this approach, organizational culture provides insight into the effectiveness of the U.S. Army's role as a member of larger organizations within the unified action environment.

Lines of Effort as a Symbol

To further develop the analytical framework, a specific definition of organizational culture is required in order to derive the role of symbols. Clifford Geertz in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, defined culture as a semiotic concept, an “interworked system of construable signs (what, ignoring provincial usages, I would call symbols).”⁶¹ He articulated a symbolic interpretive view of culture. According to this view, “culture is not power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, thickly—described.”⁶² Geertz's definition provides a significant emphasis on the logical interpretation of organizational symbols in cultural analysis. When taken in conjunction with Schein's view of organizational culture, the role of symbols is determined. Schein contends that culture is an inside-out process in which assumptions, values and norms surface in the form of artifacts. Consequently, artifacts possess internal transformative and external interpretative properties. Internally, artifacts and norms are “consciously and creatively used by the members of a culture to express their identity and pursue their purposes.”⁶³ Externally, artifacts can be interpreted in the form of symbols, due to what Hatch called a “theoretical relationship between cultural symbols and artifacts.”⁶⁴ This occurs when members of the culture attach meaning to an artifact for the purposes of communicating that meaning to others. In the U.S. Army, uniform rank, patches, and unit designations are simple examples of symbols that are vitally

⁶¹ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 14.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory, Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 217.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 220.

important to daily operations and critical components of organizational culture. The use of the term symbol in this monograph has a deeper connotation as defined by Hatch: “a symbol is anything that represents a conscious or unconscious association with some wider concept or meaning. Thus, a symbol consists of both a tangible form and the wider meaning (or meanings) with which it is associated.”⁶⁵

Symbols fall into three broad categories: physical objects, behavioral events, and verbal expressions. As a physical representation of objectives, tasks and missions linked to an end state, LOE are treated as a physical object that represents a strategy in this study. The term strategy in this connotation refers to “top management’s planned efforts to influence organizational outcomes by managing the organization’s relationship to its environment.”⁶⁶ The LOE depict planned relationships between the organization and the environment. Therefore, by Hatch’s definition the LOE are a symbol of strategy. The symbolic-interpretive perspective focuses on the role of strategy in the social construction of organizations. Hatch expanded on Karl Weick’s extensive work on the relationship between symbols and strategists to show their significant linkage.⁶⁷

Strategy is a powerful symbol that fulfills rationalistic expectations for leadership. The role of strategist is, therefore, also symbolic; the strategist is a symbol of the culture that looks for leadership in the form of strategy. So long as strategists produce strategy, regardless of whether it precedes or follows actions, those who hold expectations are satisfied and life in the organization proceeds along its usual course. [Weick] claims that they can use their symbolic potency to inspire confidence to act and to encourage improvisational activity, both of which he believes enhance the effectiveness of organizing by promoting learning.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Hatch, *Organization Theory*, 219.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 101.

⁶⁷ Hatch prior to her most extensive work as a theorist, *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives* in 1997, published a theory on organizational culture. Mary Jo Hatch, “The Dynamics of Organizational Culture,” *Academy of Management Review* 18 (1993): 657-687. It is apparent that her theory and reputation as a theorist are taken forward in her work on *Organization Theory*.

⁶⁸ Hatch, *Organization Theory*, 115.

As defined here, leaders of organizations, as strategists, fulfill a symbolic role. Using the theoretical construct of the symbolic interpretive view, operational commanders themselves fulfill the role of strategists and impart strategy using symbols such as LOE.

The determination of the LOE as a symbol of strategy serves as the key component of the analytical framework used in this study. The first step of each case study analysis will establish the LOE as a symbol of strategy. This occurs through the evaluation of case study evidence in which references or uses of LOE by the commander demonstrate a broad incorporation of the concept with respect to the organization's relationship to its environment. This is observed when LOE are described as an organizing force that allowed the members of the organization to achieve unity of effort. Another equally important characteristic of a symbol is its inherent ambiguity, which allows the same symbol to support multiple meanings. Symbols also have a certain constraining element that rules out unnecessary interpretations.

Strategic Ambiguity

In 1984, Eric Eisenberg published, "Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication," to provide a theory for how people in organizations use ambiguity to accomplish their goals.⁶⁹ His theoretical basis aligns with the idea of strategy as symbols when he states, "organizational members use symbols strategically to accomplish goals, and in doing so may not always be completely open or clear."⁷⁰ The theory bridges both organizational and communications sciences making it particularly valuable to the study of the LOE.

⁶⁹ Eric M. Eisenberg, "Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication" in *Strategic Ambiguities: Essays on Communication, Organization, and Identity*, ed. Eric M. Eisenberg (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), 51.

⁷⁰Ibid., 4.

Eisenberg defines strategic ambiguity as the purposeful use of ambiguity to accomplish goals. In the context of interagency partners, ambiguity is a core value. Amanda Smith in “Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation,” provides evidence to this claim.

The State Department’s and the NSC [National Security Council] Staff’s implicit demand for ambiguity and flexibility [which] clashes with Defense’s explicit drive for clarity and precision in orders issued to soldiers on the ground. This functional difference leads Defense officials to express outrage at the perceived vagueness of the State Department’s call for DoD assistance, and frustration on the part of the State Department at Defense’s demand for precision and its “unyielding” attitude.⁷¹

This adds merit to the point of view that ambiguity can generate positive organizational action. Eisenberg contends that ambiguity in this manner allows for multiple interpretations and facilitates four organizational functions; the capacity to: promote unified diversity, facilitate transformative change, foster deniability and preserve privilege. In line with a symbolic interpretive view, Eisenberg argues that strategic ambiguity is a consistent state because there is “no purely objective reality to describe, the existence of literal language becomes questionable, and all meaning is seen as fundamentally contextual and constructed, at least partly, by individuals.”⁷² He furthered this view by stating that “language, perception, and knowledge are completely interdependent.”⁷³ Through this logic, the theory of strategic ambiguity is fundamentally dependent on an interactional context; specifically between the leader, the symbol of strategy, and the organization. In order to effectively analyze the LOE against the OIF case studies, two of Eisenberg’s four resultants will be utilized. The two organization criteria—capacity to promote unified diversity and facilitate organizational change—are utilized for their determinable value to

⁷¹ Amanda Smith, “Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation” in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*. ed. Jay W. Boggs and Joseph R. Cerami (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 24.

⁷² Eisenberg, *Ambiguity as Strategy*, 5.

⁷³ Ibid.

the JIIM organization as a whole.⁷⁴ After establishing the LOE as a symbol of strategy in each case study, an assessment to determine ambiguity is made based upon the actual LOE or general references made to the LOE.

Strategic Ambiguity Promotes Unified Diversity

The use of strategic ambiguity to promote unified diversity defines a fundamental purpose of LOE, to create unity of effort among JIIM partners. Doctrine states, “the LOE is a valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical.”⁷⁵ Eisenberg’s theory takes a counterintuitive stand to what many organizational theorists state as an organization imperative, a well defined objective. Eisenberg asserts that “that there can be many advantages to cultivating inconsistency among goals, such as increased creativity and flexibility.”⁷⁶ He elaborates on this point to bring out what he terms a paradox in organizations. “How can cohesion and coordination be promoted while at the same time maintaining sufficient individual freedom to ensure flexibility, creativity, and adaptability to environmental change?”⁷⁷ This paradox is readily apparent in unified action considering the difference between command and control within a U.S. Army unit, collaboration with U.S. Government (USG) agencies and

⁷⁴ Although the analysis of the case studies examines various forms of strategic communications, articles, books, journals, the two communication criteria, foster deniability and preserve privilege are outside the scope of this monograph. Examining the communication perspective would require an analysis of the effectiveness of the organization’s messages on an external audience and a substantial theoretical background. The integrity of Eisenberg’s theory is maintained due to the discernable theoretical split between the pairs of criteria. Eisenberg’s literature review and theoretical support for the capacity to promote unified diversity and facilitate organizational change are organizational theorists, such as Smircich and Weick, while the other two criteria are backed by communication theorists, such as Linda Putnam and Ed Wycoff. Eisenberg stated two methods for analysis of the organization criteria as social constructed studies and rhetorical analysis. Rhetorical analysis is used exclusively with these criteria.

⁷⁵ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13.

⁷⁶ Eisenberg, *Ambiguity as Strategy*, 8.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

cooperation with NGOs and multinational partners. As shown in Figure 4, Joint Operations, the Whole of Government Approach, and the Comprehensive Approach are arranged in concentric circles. Each wider circle encompasses the previous, symbolizing more organizations involved in the operation. Joint Operations as the core circle represents all U.S. military forces and their capability to execute command and control. The next circle, the Whole of Government Approach, includes USG interagency organizations such as the Department of State (DOS) and shows the requirement for a collaborative relationship. The outer circle, the Comprehensive Approach, includes intergovernmental organizations and multinational forces and shows the requirement for a cooperative relationship. The further from the center of the circles the less inherent organizational control the Army or Joint commander maintains.⁷⁸




Figure 4. Concept of approaches used in a JIIM environment.⁷⁹

Ernest Becker stated in *The Structure of Evil*, the conflict between cohesion and flexibility is irresolvable and the goal of the organization should be “maximum individuality within maximum community.”⁸⁰ Eisenberg posits the best method of managing this paradox is through the development of

⁷⁸ Inherent organizational control in this context refers to the control Army and Joint commanders exercise through command, which is not prevalent in a whole of government or comprehensive approach.

⁷⁹ FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 2008, 2-5. Adapted to incorporate every type of JIIM partner, the organizations portrayed on the circles is taken from FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 2008, Appendix A. *Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations in Stability Operations*, A-1-A-14.

⁸⁰ Ernest Becker, *The Structure of Evil* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 251.

strategies that seek to preserve and manage the inherent differences and prescribes the creative use of symbols as the method.

Values are expressed in this form because their equivocal expression allows for multiple interpretations while at the same time promoting a sense of unity. It is therefore not the case that people are moved toward the same views (in any objectively verifiable sense) but rather that the ambiguous statement of core values allows them to maintain individual interpretations while at the same time believing that they are in agreement.⁸¹

Symbols used in this way allow for the existence of multiple viewpoints in the organization.

Consequently agreement is reached on abstractions without limiting specific interpretations.

Organizational symbolism facilitates a leader's ability to rapidly incorporate new members into the organization and cooperate with other organizations toward common goals. A critical leader responsibility is to infuse employees with values and purpose. Eisenberg contends the leadership process "is less one of consensus-making and more one of using language strategically to express values at a level of abstraction at which agreement can occur."⁸² Even more importantly is his emphasis on effective leaders who use strategic ambiguity to foster creativity and "guard against the acceptance of one standard way of viewing organizational reality."⁸³

The importance of guarding from one view of organizational reality should not be underscored in the context of complex COIN operations. This is due to the important relationship between variety and adaptation. Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen contend that variety is a critical requirement for adaptation. Variation allows for the members of the organization that are best suited for the current situation to act, while those not best suited, remain valuable in the future.⁸⁴ This is directly applicable to

⁸¹ Eisenberg, *Ambiguity as Strategy*, 8.

⁸² Ibid., 9.

⁸³ Ibid. Eisenberg's conclusion has similarities to the U.S. Army doctrinal concept, mission command, "the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution" in which subordinate leaders act "aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent." FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, Glossary-10.

⁸⁴ Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 32.

the size and scope of JIIM partners in a military operation and the knowledge and resources each potentially offers along different lines of effort. Adaptation is the ability of an organization to remain relevant to its environment over time. Hence, the relationship between variation and adaptation is temporal relevance. Otherwise stated, variation enables adaptation because it allows for the relevant perspective to be applied a various times.

Despite the importance variety to an organization in complex environments, Axelrod and Cohen conclude that there is a “right balance between variety and uniformity.”⁸⁵ Unified diversity achieves this balance. The promotion of unified diversity is a fundamental aspect of unity of effort and serves as an essential criteria used to measure how effective the LOE achieved unity of effort in the case studies. A commander is said to use the LOE to promote unified diversity if: he described actions along the LOE in ambiguous terms for the benefit of a partner’s consensus; the organization had extensive JIIM partners oriented on the LOE; the organization performed a significant number of diverse activities along the LOE; and subcomponent organizations performed a significant number of diverse activities across multiple lines. This criteria evaluates the organization’s orientation with different partners, while the criteria defined in the next section evaluates the organization’s flexibility.

Strategic Ambiguity Facilitates Organizational Change

Eisenberg’s contention that strategic ambiguity facilitates organizational change is contingent upon the assumption that the commander uses strategy as a symbol. The level of unified diversity is inextricably linked to the organization’s ability to change and the commander’s leadership ability to orchestrate the change. The transformation process occurs through the degree of freedom provided by

⁸⁵ Axelrod and Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity*, 32.

strategic ambiguity to shift organizational goals.⁸⁶ Ambiguous goals developed within a responsible rigor provide flexibility. Eisenberg provides his explanation:

A rational organizational strategy is to be ambiguous, employing a statement such as, “The University shall be responsive to its surrounding areas,” in public documents so as to retain flexibility to adapt to future constituencies. Organizational goals are expressed ambiguously to allow organizations the freedom to alter operations which have become maladaptive over time.⁸⁷

The relevance of his concept comes from his assertion that “this characteristic of ambiguity is especially important to organizations in turbulent environments, in which ambiguous goals can preserve a sense of continuity while allowing for gradual changes in interpretation over time.”⁸⁸ This aspect of flexibility is significantly important to the concept of the LOE, since “as operations progress, commanders may modify the lines of effort after assessing conditions and collaborating with multinational military and civilian partners.”⁸⁹

In his book, *A Grammar of Motives*, Kenneth Burke provided a stronger assertion to the contention that strategic ambiguity can assist in change.

What we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but in terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise. Hence, instead of considering it our task to ‘dispose of’ any ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study and clarify the resources of ambiguity. It is in these areas of ambiguity that transformation takes place: in fact, without such areas, transformation would be impossible.⁹⁰

Burke’s and Eisenberg’s arguments are rooted in the realization that organizations must orient to the future while maintaining a level of flexibility to adjust to its uncertainties.

As discussed in the literature review, Eisenberg, like most symbolic interpretive and modernist organization theorists, views leaders within the organization as the primary change drivers. He refers to

⁸⁶ Eisenberg, *Ambiguity as Strategy*, 10-11.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 12.

⁸⁹ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13.

⁹⁰ Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), xx-xxi.

effective leaders as change masters that use tools to create change. “The tools of change masters are creative and interactive; they have an intellectual, a conceptual, and a cultural aspect. Change masters deal in symbols and visions and shared understanding as well as the techniques and trappings of their own specialties.”⁹¹ The intent of a commander’s use of LOE as described in FM 3-0, *Operations*, fits this description. “Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support other instruments of national power.”⁹² The commander’s use of the LOE as a symbol and method of shared understanding is a key aspect to organizational change that requires analysis.

The cases used in this study are commander centric and remain in line with Eisenberg’s change master assertions. A commander is said to use LOE to facilitate organizational change if: he determined that organizational change was necessary; utilized the LOE to create organizational change; and the organization fundamentally changed.

Case Study 1 - “Winning the Peace,” 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad

Major General Peter Chiarelli, Commander 1st Cavalry Division (1st CD), deployed his division to Baghdad in OIF II (2004-2005) prepared for full spectrum operations, a stark contrast to the conventional lethal approaches of many U.S. Army divisions before him. Chiarelli’s imperative to change the organizational culture of his division prior to arrival in Iraq would result in the formulation of a campaign plan centered on the concept of LOE. This case study provides an overview of 1st CD’s rotation in OIF II with specific focus on the contextual background and formulation of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan.

⁹¹ Eisenberg, *Ambiguity as Strategy*, 11.

⁹² FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008, 6-13.

Prevailing Context Facing OIF II

The prevailing context in Iraq facing 1st CD in Baghdad, Iraq was an unchecked insurgency borne from a combination of a capitulated Hussein regime and a lack of coalition planning for Phase IV, stabilization, resulting from gross disconnects between DOD and other governmental agencies, specifically Department of State and a fragmented contingent of Iraqi Security Forces.⁹³ The essential problem Chiarelli identified from U.S. Army operations after the ground campaign in 2003 was one firmly set in a military organizational culture of conventional kinetic operations. He observed,

From an organizational perspective, the Army has successfully created the most modern, effective set of systems for rapid execution of combat operations on the planet. We can achieve immediate effects through command and control of our organic systems. What we have not been able to do is create the systems and processes to execute the nonlethal side as effortlessly as combat operations. Our own regulations, bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate the ability of our soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronized nonlethal effects across the battlespace.⁹⁴

He recognized the need to achieve simultaneity through full spectrum operations, because the Army's "kinetic then non-kinetic" mindset provided the enemy with a significant advantage.⁹⁵ He would later state, "while the enemy may have been adapting to the military's actions, the 1st Cavalry had been forced to adapt before it ever arrived in Baghdad."⁹⁶

⁹³ Timothy R. Reese and Dr. Donald P. Wright, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, June 2008), 70-111. Summary of contextual events from 2003 until 2004 as sourced from *On Point II*.

⁹⁴ Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 15.

⁹⁵ John Blackwell, "Rebuilding Baghdad: Restoring Essential Services and Reducing Anti-State Forces" (master's thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2008), 6.

⁹⁶ Samantha L. Quigley, "Adaptability was Key to Success, 1st Cav Commander Says, *Department of Defense News*, April 6, 2005, 2.

Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan

Chiarelli's solution was to change the mindset of 1st CD before deployment, in essence creating formal internal organizational change. He redefined the Iraqi center of gravity as 'fence sitters,' the bulk of the populace that is undecided, which led to a focus on reconstruction and restoration of basic services.⁹⁷ *On Point II*, captured his perspective clearly when Chiarelli stated, "public works projects [like electricity and water] may be more effective than guns in deciding the future of Iraq."⁹⁸ This realization was instrumental to the alignment of the Division's approach and served as the basis of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan. The redefined vision was to deny direct or indirect insurgent influence and decisively engage the fence-sitters "through his belief that reconstruction projects were fundamental to success, especially projects that employed large numbers of Iraqis and tangibly improved the community."⁹⁹ The campaign plan was informed through collaboration with their predecessors in Baghdad, 1st Armored Division (1st AD), and a thorough historical, cultural and doctrinal analysis. Chiarelli stated, "What became clear to the task force during mission analysis and mission preparation was that to achieve the operational goal the task force had to simultaneously work along five (sic) equally balanced, interconnected lines of operations."¹⁰⁰

The Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan was comprised of an end state with six lines of effort: combat operations, train and employ security forces, essential services, promote governance, economic pluralism and not depicted but stated above is a sixth line, Information Operations capability (see Figure 5). The desired end state was defined as "a secure and stable environment for Iraqis, maintained by

⁹⁷ Norman E. Emery, "Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects," *Military Review* (November-December 2005): 28.

⁹⁸ Reese and Wright, *On Point II*, 124.

⁹⁹ Edward O'Connell and Bruce R. Pirnie, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003-2006* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), 42.

¹⁰⁰ Chiarelli and Michaelis, "Winning the Peace", 7. There were actually six LOE.

indigenous police and security forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism.”¹⁰¹




Figure 5. Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan.¹⁰²

The 1st CD assumed responsibility for the Baghdad Area of Responsibility (AOR) on April 15, 2004 from 1st Armored Division. The 1st CD (now deemed Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Task Force Baghdad) was a vast and diverse organization comprised of 62 U.S. battalions, 7 Iraqi battalions and support forces totaling over 40,000 people spread across the overpopulated and underdeveloped Iraqi capital, comparable to the size of Chicago.¹⁰³ The mission required a guiding strategy that provided flexibility. The division executed a diverse array of operations over a one year rotation that precisely aligned with the definition of full spectrum operations as outlined in FM 3-0,

¹⁰¹ Reese and Wright, *On Point II*, 124. The caption read, “1st Cavalry Division lines of operation and end state.”

¹⁰² Ibid., 124.

¹⁰³ Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “The 1st Cav in Baghdad: Counterinsurgency EBO in Dense Urban Terrain.” *Field Artillery* (September 1, 2005), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/chiarelliinterview.pdf> (accessed August 14, 2009). The International Organization for Migration states the population of Baghdad was 6.5 million in 2004.

Operations. These operations included: combat operations against insurgents to include Muqtada Al Sadr's forces, enabling Iraqi Army and Police forces tooth-to-tail development, execution of massive infrastructure projects that employed local Iraqi labor, and an extensive role in the successful national election in January 2005.

“Winning the Peace” Analysis

Chiarelli in his co-authored article, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” substantiated the importance of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan to his organization.

But the task force, through adherence to an overall thematically based commander's intent, maintained orientation on a well-founded operational campaign plan balanced across five integrated conceptual lines of operations (LOOs). Each LOO was tied to a robust IO capability (equating to a sixth LOO), moving incrementally and cumulatively toward decisively accomplishing the ultimate goal of shifting Baghdad away from instability and a fertile recruiting ground for insurgents, to a thriving modern city encompassing one-third of Iraq's population.¹⁰⁴

This excerpt describes the organization's alignment with its purpose, environment and endstate and presents the Task Force Baghdad Campaign plan as a symbol. The key phrase “maintained orientation” implies ambiguity, in that it is a deliberate statement that does not invoke precision, allowing for multiple interpretations by organizational members.¹⁰⁵ The term “conceptual” in the description ties directly to the definition of a symbol as “anything that represents a conscious or unconscious association with some wider concept or meaning.”¹⁰⁶ For the organization, the campaign plan symbolically represented the path

¹⁰⁴ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” 5. At the time of this article LOO (lines of operation) were codified in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, *Operations* as physical or logical lines of operation. Taking in account the full context of the article and additional descriptions in *On Point II*, LOO in this description are logical lines of operation, later renamed lines of effort with the release of the 2008 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*.

¹⁰⁵ Merriam-Webster's, 10th ed., s.v. “Conceptual.” The dictionary defines orientation as “a general or lasting direction of thought, inclination, or interest.”

¹⁰⁶ Hatch, *Organization Theory*, 219.

to perceived organizational success. For Chiarelli, the campaign plan enabled the division to conduct full spectrum operations. “I believe you must work all six lines.”¹⁰⁷

The promotion of unified diversity becomes apparent in the description of how they functioned across the organization. At the unit level, “brigades orchestrated the five (sic) LOOs, and resourced combat operations run by battalion commanders and mostly, company commanders or platoon leaders.”¹⁰⁸ At the soldier and leader level, Chiarelli depicted in a general narrative the deliberate and seamless movement across each LOE.

Our Soldiers routinely balanced conducting combat operations at six a.m. to handing out humanitarian supplies at eight a.m. Then they deftly shifted to help educate Iraqi entrepreneurs on how to put together a business plan and apply for a small business loan at 10 a.m. to training Iraqi Security Forces on how to conduct professional development sessions with their own forces by one p.m. Later in the day, that same unit would balance conducting detainee operations with meeting with local NAC leaders about an infrastructure project that needed to be accomplished. Soldiers and leaders made it all happen.¹⁰⁹

Both descriptions, although not specific, demonstrate the diverse activities that subcomponent organizations performed.

The Task Force Baghdad Campaign plan, used as a symbol by Chiarelli, became an intricate part of 1st CD’s organizational culture as a value and norm. Hatch stated this occurs because as symbols and artifacts are externally interpreted they simultaneously transform the very organizational “values and assumptions that produced them in the first place.”¹¹⁰ Weick’s symbolic-interpretative perspective asserts this occurs because strategists (Chiarelli) “use their symbolic potency to inspire confidence to act and to encourage improvisational activity.”¹¹¹ In turn, this will “enhance the effectiveness of organizing by

¹⁰⁷ Quigley, “Adaptability,” 2.

¹⁰⁸ Hollis, “The 1st Cav in Baghdad.”

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Hatch, *Organization Theory*, 217.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 155.

promoting learning.”¹¹² This occurred through a continual process of learning and adaptation. Chiarelli captured this point exactly when he stated, “this became an education process across the division in mentally shifting from that which we were comfortable with (combat operations and training) to a far broader set of critical tasks.”¹¹³ The resultant organizational culture advanced the capacity to promote unified diversity and integration of Task Force Baghdad, Iraqi security and government partners, NGOs and the interagency.

Chiarelli integrated JIIM partners along every line of effort, “essential services, governance, and economic pluralism-coupled with aggressive counterinsurgency operations and training and equipping Baghdad’s police and security force, produced an integrated, synergistic approach to accomplishing objectives within the Task Forces Baghdad Campaign Plan.”¹¹⁴ His use of “synergistic” implies strategic ambiguity from the sense that multiple interpretations are necessary for cooperative action and decentralized execution.¹¹⁵ This directly correlates with Eisenberg’s basis for unified diversity, in which a commander’s use of strategy as a symbol affords multiple interpretations. The most logical deduction that supports Chiarelli’s use of strategic ambiguity comes from the sheer size of Task Force Baghdad and the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The following summary of events depicted along each LOE presents the effectiveness of the campaign plan, which in turn provides evidence of unified diversity. Along the combat operations and train and employ security forces LOE, Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces were integrated into the planning and execution of full spectrum operations. Embedded U.S. advisory and training teams enabled

¹¹² Hatch, *Organization Theory*, 155.

¹¹³ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” 14.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Webster’s, s.v. “Synergy.” The dictionary defines the term as a “mutually advantageous conjunction or compatibility of distinct business partners or elements (as resources or efforts).” This supports a cooperative approach that would be necessary to integrate all JIIM partners.

over 3,000 independent Iraqi-only missions. In February 2005, an Iraqi Army brigade assumed a contentious AOR in downtown Baghdad, while other Iraqi battalions conducted daily patrols and neighborhood outreach programs.¹¹⁶ Along the promote governance LOE, every level of command was intimately involved in coordinating, educating, and mentoring Iraqi government representatives. The 1st CD's creation of a governance support team (GST), led by Colonel Ken Cox, established essential coordination with Baghdad's city hall, while communicating with many agencies provided direct coordination and cooperation needed to synchronize government support of reconstruction.¹¹⁷ Similar integration along the economic pluralism LOE mutually supported the relationships along the promote governance line. Working closely with NGOs, local government opportunities for businesses were developed and supported through Chiarelli's use of Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds.¹¹⁸ Cooperation with the Mayor of Baghdad resulted in the restoration of the Abu Nuwas River District.¹¹⁹ These events occurred along specific LOE within the campaign plan with multiple partners demonstrating unified diversity within the organization.

The essential services LOE provided the most extensive example of unified diversity in two ways. 1st CD's actions along this line involved the most JIIM partners. More importantly, Chiarelli's perceived organizational success along this line served as a realization of his plan to conduct organizational change. Division engineers "established a cooperative effort with the University of Baghdad to identify, fund, and work with local government officials, contractors, the U.S. Department of

¹¹⁶ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Training Iraqi Security Forces* (Carlisle, 2004), 5. 1st Cav provided over 600 soldiers for advisors and supported Iraqi operations.

¹¹⁷ L. Barrett Holmes, "Restoring Essential Services in Baghdad During Operation Iraqi Freedom II," (monograph, US Army War College, 2007), 4.

¹¹⁸ Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons, The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, 2009), 167.

¹¹⁹ Jackie Spinner, "Bringing Back a Dying Baghdad Street in Effort to Restore Normalcy, U.S. Army Attempts to Rebuild a Once-Thriving Area," *Washington Post*, August 23, 2004.

State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)” to provide essential services.¹²⁰ The most noteworthy project was the building of the Al Rasheed landfill in southern Baghdad. The project mobilized the local economy and employed over 1,900 Iraqi workers.¹²¹ The creation of essential services along the “first-mile” was Chiarelli’s emphasis, “creating symbols of true progress by establishing basic local services and providing employment within neighborhoods ripe for insurgent recruitment.”¹²² His use of ‘symbol’ in this statement was purposeful and a consequential rhetorical element. His usage is in line with the symbolic interpretive approach to organizational culture and adds merit to the deduction that he used the Task Force Baghdad Campaign plan as a symbol. He extends symbol from artifact (LOOs) to action (creation of essential services). The information operations (IO) LOE was extensively managed and controlled by Chiarelli and the 1st CD staff, suggesting significant precision within the IO LOE.

As shown, Chiarelli’s use of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan as a symbol created significant unified diversity in every LOE, except IO. The size of the force, a large and highly populated AOR, and the requirement for numerous partner relationships were contributing factors in Chiarelli’s use of strategic ambiguity. This analysis has shown that Chiarelli’s formulation of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign generated significant change in the organizational culture of the Division. Subsequently, the change in organizational culture created a self-perpetuating effect that undoubtedly contributed to unified diversity with JIIM partners. In the conclusion of this article, Chiarelli’s provides valuable insights regarding the cumulative and interdependent effects of the LOE in a COIN environment.

Although arming small-unit leaders with knowledge so they can determine the right course of action is the correct procedure, there was rarely (if ever) one decisive operation that would unequivocally shift the currents of change toward certain victory. Rather, it was the net effect of many microdecisive [sic] actions performed along all interconnected lines of operation that left the indelible mark of true progress. Transition along the interconnected lines of operations began

¹²⁰ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” 10.

¹²¹ Ken Dilanian, “Threats and Violence Test Ambitious Reconstruction Plans,” *Seattle Times*, July 14, 2004, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/nationworld/2001978962_rebuild14.html (accessed October 14, 2009).

¹²² Ibid., 10.

with acknowledging that it was a battle with multiple indicators and multiple conceptual fronts. A decisive, exhilarating “win” along one of the lines of operations would only create a salient to be predictably eroded by the insurgent. The broad collection of small, decisive victories along all the lines of operations, supporting each other in a delicate balance of perception and purpose, would move the campaign toward positive results.¹²³

His remarks endorse the absolute need for unified diversity along ‘multiple fronts’ to create the ‘broad collection’ of victories on all LOE. This implies the need for an adaptive organization. Similar to Chiarelli, General David Petraeus as MNF-I commander was compelled to change his organization’s culture in order to realign the organization with the environment. Petraeus would have to create unified diversity on a far larger scale.

Case Study 2- “The New Way Forward”: MNF-I

In 2007, the U.S. strategy in OIF was significantly shifted by Presidential mandate and called “The New Way Forward.” It was implemented in 2007 by the newly appointed MNF-I Commander, General David Petraeus. He faced significant challenges that resulted from four years of failed strategy, an immense insurgency, and a fractured Iraqi government. This case study presents a detailed explanation of the prevailing context in order to portray the politics and depth of organizational change General Petraeus faced. A brief background of General Petraeus’ work on FM 3-24 and an unclassified version of the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan are key features of the case study.

Operation Iraqi Freedom 2006-2007, Prevailing Context

A continual increase in sectarian violence, lack of capable governance at the national and provincial levels, and more significantly the American public’s absolute disapproval for the lack of progress in Iraq, compelled a change in the Iraq strategy. *The Iraq Study Group Report* (ISG), the most influential of three assessments conducted at the end of 2006, coined the phrase, “The New Way

¹²³ Chiarelli and Michaelis, “Winning the Peace,” 16.

Forward,” which conveyed a central message that security was a prerequisite for progress. (See figure 6)

To meet the security imperative, the group recommended “a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.”¹²⁴ In addition to the three lines of effort, political, security, and economic, from the 2005 Bush strategy, the ISG recommended a regional line. A White House review of the ISG report in reference to the lines of effort concluded, “while political progress, economic gains, and security are intertwined, political and economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security.”¹²⁵ On January 10, 2007, in an address to the nation, President Bush announced the implementation of the “New Way Forward” strategy and his intention of sending more than twenty thousand additional more combat troops to Iraq.




Figure 6. Conclusions of Iraq Study Group Report¹²⁶

¹²⁴ James A. Baker and Lee Hamilton, *Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, December 2006), 50.

¹²⁵ National Security Council, *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review* (Washington, January 2007), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf> (accessed September 20, 2009).

¹²⁶ Thomas Ricks, “The General’s Insurgency, The Gamble: Key Documents” *Washington Post*, February 7, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020701189.html> (accessed September 29, 2009).

“The Surge” and General Petraeus

On February 10, 2007, General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey as the commander of MNF-I. This would be Petraeus' third position as a commanding general in OIF. In 2003, he was the Commander of 101st Airborne Division. In 2004, he served as the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq (MNSTC-I) responsible for equipping, training and mentoring the ISF. From 2005 to his Presidential appointment in 2007 as MNF-I Commander, Petraeus served as the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center. During his time at Fort Leavenworth, he would assemble a vast team of counterinsurgency experts and actively preside with Marine Lieutenant General James Amos over the development of FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.¹²⁷ Petraeus later confirmed his intentions of FM 3-24 at the 2008 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting.

And that gets to the idea of additional counterinsurgency concepts that we employed in increasing amounts because along with the surge came a certain number of big ideas. These were, of course, institutionalized in the counterinsurgency field manual that was published in late 2006. A number of us had quite a bit of time back in the States 12 or 15 months or so between tours [when] we were able to reflect, to research, to think and then to capture ideas, best practices, lessons learned and so forth on counterinsurgency and to codify them in that field manual, and then, indeed, to put them into effect out in the field.¹²⁸

Although the LOE were codified in doctrine in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, FM 3-24 developed the LOE within a COIN environment with depth and extreme precision.¹²⁹ Chapter 5 of FM 3-24 provides thirteen pages that describe the LOE and it is no accident that an expanded application of the

¹²⁷ Steve Coll, “The General’s Dilemma: David Petraeus, the pressures of politics, and the road out of Iraq,” *New Yorker*, September 8, 2008. Petraeus’ hands on approach and intricate involvement in every step of FM3-24’s development streamlined its publication to an unprecedented 11 months.

¹²⁸ Dennis Steele, “After Action Report: The Surge from Gen. Petraeus’ Perspective,” Association of the United States Army, <http://www.ausa.org> (accessed September 25, 2009).

¹²⁹ Use of LOE is deliberate. As previously noted, both FM 3-0 (2001) and FM 3-24 use the term Logical Lines of Operation (LLO), the use of Lines of Effort (LOE) replaced the term LLO in accordance with FM 3-0 (2008).

revised “clear, hold, build” approach and the Tal Afar vignette immediately follow in the same chapter.¹³⁰ It is important to note that FM 3-24 provides significant insight into Petraeus’ actions as MNF-I Commander. The manual’s wide distribution, military and civilian alike, facilitated the creation of the most important civil-military relationship he would have as MNF-I Commander. “Ambassador Ryan Crocker, a veteran diplomat, would read the manual early in 2007 as he prepared to go to Iraq as Petraeus’ civilian counterpart.”¹³¹

The relationship between Crocker and Petraeus was in itself a symbol of a highly productive collaborative interagency partnership. Petraeus would later provide a clear description of their critical relationship in Iraq.

Certainly, there's never going to be unity of command in an endeavor like this. The ambassador rightly reports to the Secretary of State, the military commander reports up through a theater commander to – through the chairman to the secretary of Defense. But they can be joined together. Ambassador Crocker and I met – seldom if ever met with Prime Minister Maliki without the other present. We felt we had an effective tag team effort in that regard. We met with congressional delegations together. We met with other important visitors together. Our offices were separated only by a joint waiting room in the embassy. So again, there was a huge effort to present a united front, and then to echo and re-echo that attitude down through our respective chains of command into our organizations. And in truth, cooperation was not optional. It was going to happen. And we formed fusion cells. We did joint assessments together, even as painful as those were. And again, that's how you have to, again, try to achieve progress in an endeavor like this.¹³²

Upon their arrival to MNF-I in February 2007, Petraeus and Crocker assembled a group of outside advisors to form a Joint Strategic Assessment Team to formulate the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) (see

¹³⁰ George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” *New Yorker*, April 10, 2006. In 2005, Tal Afar was an Al Qaeda stronghold and 3rd ACR, under Colonel H.R. McMaster employed a different approach to Clear, Hold, Build. Instead of clearing an area to remove terrorists without seizing the terrain as was the normal trend of coalition forces, Iraqi and Coalition forces pursued a strategy of clearing a city of terrorists, leaving well-trained Iraqi units behind to hold the city, and working with local leaders to build economic and political infrastructure.

¹³¹ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (Penguin Press, New York, 2009), 31.

¹³² David Petraeus, “General David Petraeus’ Special Presentation Oct. 7, 2008 at AUSA’s Annual Meeting” (lecture presented at the annual meeting of AUSA, Washington, October 7, 2008, <http://www.ausa.org> (accessed September 25, 2009)).

Figure 7). The JCP represented the strategy for stability in Iraq, in which the surge was a component. The JCP was a comprehensive plan with temporal goals arrayed along four lines of effort: political, security, economic, and diplomatic.




Figure 7. MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan, 2007 (unclassified rendering)¹³³

The Petraeus and Crocker JCP differed significantly from the JCP of 2006, due to the fundamental change in purpose. The embedded relationship of the LOE to the fundamental purpose of the operation is an essential point of clarification. Unity of purpose in Casey's JCP was directed at rapid buildup and transition to ISF described "As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down," by the Bush Administration in 2005.¹³⁴ The orientation of the LOE in Casey's JCP proved incompatible with the environment; however, evidence suggests the organization maintained a modicum of unity of effort. The

¹³³ David J. Kilcullen, "Dinosaurs versus Mammals: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq" (presentation presented at the Rand Insurgency Board, Washington, May 8, 2008). The actual Joint Campaign Plan is classified; Kilcullen provides this unclassified version for training interagency partners.

¹³⁴ John D. Banusiewicz, "As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down, Bush Tells Nation", *Department of Defense News*, June 28, 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16277> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

lesson of Tal Afar codified by the Bush Administration recognized a shift in orientation with the modification of the original ‘clear, hold, build.’ Petraeus' position as a critical link in FM 3-24's approval process ensured the field manual captured the change in orientation which directly influenced the orientation of his JCP toward a revised purpose of population security. To Petraeus, population security provided the correct fit of the JCP with the environment and the organization. In a press briefing in March 2007, during the initial stages of the Baghdad Security Plan, Petraeus explained the interdependency of “clear, hold, build” and the lines of effort, capturing the critical orientation of the JCP with the environment and the organization.

We and our Iraqi partners recognize that improving security for the Iraqi people is the first step in rekindling hope. The upward spiral we all want begins with Iraqi and coalition forces working together and locating in the neighborhoods those forces must secure...Importantly, Iraqi and coalition forces will not just clear neighborhoods, they will also hold them to facilitate the build phase of the operation and help Baghdad's residents realize aspirations beyond survival...As citizens feel safer, conditions will be set for the resumption and improvement of basic services...And it is vital that the ministry representatives in the neighborhoods are able to provide for their constituents. Also, as security improves, commerce will return and local economies will grow, thereby providing an opportunity for the energies of a resilient and talented people to be expended in increasingly productive endeavors.¹³⁵

Accordingly, Coalition Forces established scores of small combat outposts (COPs) and joint security stations (JSSs) in populated areas.¹³⁶ This strategy, also referred to as the inkblot strategy, in COIN, characterized the military surge under General Petraeus.

The surge included a significant civilian buildup in the form of Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRTs), embedded PRTs (e-PRTs) and Provincial Support Teams (PST). The significant expansion of civilian capability was viewed by Petraeus and Crocker as an essential component to the JCP, “increased security would create growing opportunities for meaningful economic and governance work at the

¹³⁵ Multinational Force-Iraq, “Multinational Press Briefing” under “CG’s Messages,” http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=128 (accessed September 16, 2009).

¹³⁶ Catherine Marie Dale, *CRS report: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress*, (Washington: CRS, February 22, 2008), 50-120.

provincial level.”¹³⁷ President Bush recognized the success of MNF-I’s inclusive approach by stating “these teams [PRTs] bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”¹³⁸

At the peak of the surge, Petraeus would command 168,000 U.S. troops, 25 PRTs, and partner with over 400,000 ISF troops. Even with the additional forces, Petraeus faced the challenge of significantly expanding MNF-I while concurrently changing the overall culture and direction of the organization as a whole.

“New Way Forward” Analysis

In the case study, Petraeus used numerous organizational symbols to create unified diversity and facilitate organizational change. These symbols include: FM 3-24, ‘New Way Forward’ strategy, the ‘surge,’ and the Joint Campaign Plan. What is more remarkable was his use of each, depending on the target audience. In 2006, he used the creation, publication, and marketing of FM 3-24 as both a symbol for unification of a comprehensive approach with other services, U.S. government agencies and intergovernmental agencies as well as a change in U.S. COIN doctrine directed at military professionals. In addressing the U.S. press and Congressional Panels, Petraeus used “surge” to present an aggressive and necessary approach to OIF.

In numerous interviews, articles, reports, presentations and books, Petraeus presented his tendency to foster strategic ambiguity which supports the assertion that he utilized the JCP as a symbol of strategy. In a statement in Baghdad, Petraeus stated that as a strategic leader he must do three things, “The first is to get the big ideas right. The second is to communicate the big ideas throughout the

¹³⁷ Dale, *CRS Report: OIF, Strategies*, 99.

¹³⁸ U.S. Agency for International Development, “Iraq PRTs,” under “Assistance for Iraq,” <http://www.usaid.gov/iraq> (accessed August 14, 2009).

organization. The third is ensuring proper execution of the big ideas.”¹³⁹ This statement suggests communication, but he is clearly stating how he must lead his organization. His repeated use of ‘big ideas’ implies an emphasis on providing a broad framework for action. After issuing a formal one page letter to the troops on his first day of command, Petraeus reflected on his message, saying “the truth is, at the strategic level, all you can do is convey a handful of ideas-a handful.”¹⁴⁰ Later he followed up, “then you do oversight, take the organizational actions that institutionalize ideas.”¹⁴¹

One such idea that Petraeus clearly wanted to institutionalize was that Iraqi reconstruction required unity of effort. In March 2007, Petraeus repeatedly day after day hounded Major General David Fastabend, MNF-I Operations Officer, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, and the Iraqi Electricity Minister to erect Tower 57, an electrical transmission tower in Baghdad, even though insurgents would dismantle it every time it was repaired. Finally, after a significant use of Iraqi and U.S. forces, the tower was repaired, and a series of COPs were emplaced to guard the tower.¹⁴² This example shows Petraeus’ deliberate involvement in the most intricate of details across the entire organization to prevent ambiguity when necessary. Petraeus’ use of strategic ambiguity, shown in documents and accounts of his actions, has a measure of reliability to his intentions. He further elaborated on his belief in strategic ambiguity in his remarks regarding initiative he expected at every level.

We tried to paint white lines on the road, if you will. We charted an azimuth, we put those white lines down, and we said: Now get on down the road. And if you get outside the white lines, we'll tell you about it. Otherwise, just keep on going. And we need you, again, to exercise initiative, in keeping with the intent that we have sketched out.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Ricks, *The Gamble*, 129.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 130.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Cloud and Jaffe, *The Fourth Star*, 261-262.

¹⁴³ Petraeus, “Special Presentation at Annual AUSA Meeting.”

Understanding Petraeus' propensity for strategic ambiguity allows for an accurate interpretation of his intentional use of the JCP as a symbol of strategy to promote unified diversity and facilitate organizational change. The JCP was developed from its onset as an ambiguous document that embraced change. "The Joint Campaign Plan certainly does not contain all the answers for the U.S. strategy in Iraq, but it is a living document and will be modified and amended as the situation there continues to develop."¹⁴⁴ The strategy was a comprehensive plan with both near-term and long-term goals along four LOE: political, security, economic and diplomatic. Petraeus provided an explanation of his use of the JCP.

And so you need at the end of the day, at the strategic level, a joint campaign plan, which Ambassador Crocker and I developed together after a joint strategic assessment by military and civilians, which had lines of operation that included political, economic, diplomatic and security as well as informational and others. And by the way, the main effort was the political line of operation. It trumped the military on occasion. And I would defer to him on occasion. And I certainly deferred to Prime Minister Maliki on occasion. Now, that would come perhaps after what diplomats occasionally call frank and open discussions but that was reality and you have to accept that, again, when you're trying to conduct this kind of operation.¹⁴⁵

Petraeus' description of the use of the JCP adheres to Eisenberg's theory in numerous ways. First, Petraeus clearly safeguards against the acceptance of one standard way of viewing the organization's reality, when he stated "it trumped the military on occasion." This supports unified diversity. Maliki's consistent references to the LOE were in collaboration with Petraeus and Crocker. Second, the collective development of the JCP represented unity while reasonably retaining the opinions of each group member due the implied context of meeting daily to determine the JCP feasibility. Third, Petraeus clearly fits the role of a change master as described by Eisenberg. Specifically in this instance, he is using the JCP as a symbol of positive change, exercising conceptual and interactive skills while remaining open to Iraqi cultural aspects. The combined assessments were an intentional element of adaptability.

¹⁴⁴ Richard S. Lowry, "The Joint Campaign Plan: A Strategy for Stability in Iraq," *The Weekly Standard*, August 8, 2007.

¹⁴⁵ Petraeus, "Special Presentation at Annual AUSA Meeting."

This case study provides the clear linkage between Petraeus and the counterinsurgency manual. A rhetorical analysis of FM 3-24, Chapter 5 provides insights into Petraeus' and Crocker's intended use of the JCP. The analysis treats the manual as a primary resource due to Petraeus' direct connection as a co-author of the manual. The analysis focuses on a key passage that correlates directly to inherent ambiguity to determine the purpose and intended purpose. "A plan based on LLOs [LOE] unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and Host Nation forces toward a common purpose."¹⁴⁶ The purpose of this passage is to state that the utility of the LOE requires a shared purpose across relevant organizations. The implied purpose is the fundamental requirement to utilize the LOE concept in a COIN environment and the need for an ambiguous purpose. This is evidenced by Petraeus' statement of the purpose: population security. The ambiguity of the purpose allows for multiple interpretations while maintaining unified diversity. Organizational biases, such as a preference to support Shia versus Sunni neighborhoods, still contribute to progress along the LOE toward the specified end state. Further, interdependencies between the lines allows for increased effectiveness. This is evidenced by the creation of COPs and JSSs in populated areas that allowed increased penetration and effectiveness by PRTs. Petraeus and President Bush both publically praised their effectiveness of this plan for "ensuring the military progress was quickly followed up with real improvements in the daily lives of the Iraqi citizens."¹⁴⁷ It is evident that a change in purpose from creating ISF (Casey) to a more ambiguous one, population security, facilitated increased unified diversity and increased organizational effectiveness.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This monograph applied an analytical framework based on the symbolic interpretive perspective of organization theory to determine how effectively the LOE as a symbol of strategy achieved unity of

¹⁴⁶ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 5-3.

¹⁴⁷ Jim Fisher-Thompson, "2008 Provincial Reconstruction Team News: General Petraeus Lauds PRT Volunteers," under "PRT News," http://iraq.usembassy.gov/prt_news_03232008.html (accessed September 3, 2009).

effort. This monograph has shown through doctrine, theory, and the case studies that unity of effort is essential to success in a COIN environment. Historically, unity of effort has proven elusive and when achieved, fleeting, particularly so in OIF. It eluded the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and MNF-I throughout the early years of the war.¹⁴⁸ Two contemporary case studies of OIF commanders who achieved an observable level of unity of effort provided the means to evaluate the LOE.

The first conclusion is the value of the LOE as a symbol of strategy which comes from the leader to the organization. This conclusion asserts that the LOE provided both Chiarelli and Petraeus a powerful organizational symbol that created, expanded, sustained, and changed their organizations toward their intended orientation. Both commanders addressed their respective LOE-based plans as an orientation toward the desired end state. For Chiarelli, this was apparent in his description of the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan. For Petraeus his description of the discussions with Crocker and Maliki maintained the organization's leadership orientation. Evidence of broad incorporation of the LOE throughout the organization is readily apparent in the 1st CD; it is only implied in the MNF-I case study. The most significant finding comes from each commander's statements concerning the LOE's importance to their organization. Each envisioned their operations along the LOE; for Chiarelli it was full spectrum operations, for Petraeus it was conducting COIN as he had envisioned it in FM 3-24. The use of the LOE as a symbol of strategy first became a symbol for the commander. Specifically, the LOE was a symbol of

¹⁴⁸ Reese and Wright, *On Point II*, 71-80. Summarized the lack of unity of effort during the OIF ground campaign. Lieutenant General Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) at the end of the ground campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in April 2003 faced significant barriers to unity of effort. Garner's efforts at effective interagency planning were stifled by prominent DOD leaders that opposed a full-scale interagency effort within ORHA. As a result, State department Iraqi experts were rejected and work with other government agencies was prohibited. The uncoordinated and disparate efforts of ORHA, CFLCC, CENTCOM and later the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created a culture of mistrust and apprehension between the U.S. Army and the interagency that directly impacted the execution of tactical missions in Phase IV.

his vision of the operation. Once the commander imparted that vision to the organization in the form of a campaign plan, the LOE became a symbol of orientation for the JIIM organization.

The LOE in its current doctrinal form was used in a planning and execution role in COIN operations in OIF by both commanders at different points of the concepts doctrinal maturity. As previously traced from each commander's vision to execution, the LOE enabled commanders to envision the organization's operation in a more holistic way. From this point, the LOE became formal campaign plans that enabled the organization to perform diverse operations and support partner operations. This supports previous academic findings regarding the concept's effectiveness as a planning tool, and it supports the organizational point of view that the LOE enable unity of effort. Even more specifically, the LOE created unity of effort explicitly by being a critical planning and execution tool throughout the operation. The LOE's effectiveness as an organizing tool can go beyond the commander's direct influence if made formally part of the planning and execution processes. Analysis evaluated key leader documents which suggest a significant correlation between LOE's effectiveness in creating unity of effort throughout the operation and the commander's demonstrated emphasis on the LOE.

Unified diversity and organizational change were created due to both the LOE and the underlying purpose that shaped the LOE. This was found true in both cases. The preceding units, 1st AD for Chiarelli and MNF-I under Casey for Petraeus, believed the purpose of their operations to be the rapid creation of ISF. Chiarelli and Petraeus redefined their purpose to be population security. Both were able to achieve unified diversity because of the increased ambiguity of the purpose: population security versus increasing the capability of ISF. In the case of Chiarelli, Iraqi local leaders became more involved. For Petraeus, a stronger relationship with Crocker, multiple governmental agencies, and Iraqi national leaders was formed. The reorientation of the LOE to population security facilitated organizational change by allowing both commanders to focus on a broader mission set. Chiarelli created governance support teams, forged partnerships with USAID, and trained his division for full spectrum operations. Petraeus utilized

his influence on FM 3-24 to change strategy in the Congress, the Army, and MNF-I. He would also use the new orientation to create stronger ties with PRTs. The conclusion follows that the ambiguity of LOE alone may create organizational change but when paired with an ambiguous but necessary purpose, LOE facilitate organizational change. The same logic applies to the effective implementation of diverse partners.

The current doctrinal form of the LOE enabled diverse partnerships and facilitated extensive organizational change at the operational level during two different critical time periods in OIF. The LOE were used effectively in the role as an element of operational design, a formal planning framework, and an execution tool throughout each campaign. Future studies aimed at changing or modifying the LOE structure to improve its effectiveness on the environment run the risk of limiting the effectiveness of the concept at creating unity of effort. This will occur if the LOE's design is over complicated and narrowly focused. LOE's current doctrinal form not only allows but implies ambiguity and simplicity. Chiarelli's depiction in "Winning the Peace" and Petraeus' example in the Joint Campaign Plan convey this point. More specifically, the most powerful symbols are simplistic, such as a cross, a swastika or the American flag. The LOE in its current form allows for multiple perspectives and allows for multiple applications.

The LOE should remain in its current doctrinal form. Future doctrinal revisions should retain the definition in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, consolidate the descriptions of the LOE from FM 3-24 and FM 3-07, and provide examples from extensive case studies to assist practitioners. Elevate the role of the LOE to a formal element of the operations process (plan, prepare, and execute). As an element of operational design, its role is less prominent, optional, and not a critical component of the operations process. One potential addition is to make the LOE a doctrinal requirement for planning guidance to facilitate unified action with JIIM partners. The formal codification of the LOE in accordance with these recommendations should be followed with coordination and cooperation with Interagency and NATO manuals to facilitate the creation of a common framework with habitual partners.

This study analyzed the LOE as an organizing tool to the extent its use in OIF facilitated unified action and organizational change. Results identified the potential value LOE can provide commanders in a unified action environment; however, there are numerous gaps in knowledge inhibiting a more comprehensive study of the concept. There is a lack of social science research projects that specifically examine unity of effort between JIIM partners in OIF. This deficiency limits LOE studies from the symbolic interpretive perspective to a rhetorical analysis of key documents. Case studies below the operational level heavily depict combat operations, preventing a vertical integration analysis of LOE at the tactical level. Despite current gaps in knowledge, this monograph provides an essential starting point for future studies of the LOE.

Past studies placed LOE as a planning framework. This study has shown the consequential purpose for doing so; create unity of effort with JIIM partners. There remain significant needs in the study of LOE as an organizing tool. There is a need for a study on commander communications, both verbal and nonverbal, on concepts of vision such as commander's intent, LOE, planning guidance in the context of various military operations with significant JIIM partners. Such research would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how Army commanders incorporate partners in operations and the importance they place on their concepts of vision. A future study directed at examining LOE used in an ambiguous manner at various tactical levels to determine unity of effort is warranted. This study would contribute to understanding the value of vertical integration or nesting with operational level LOE and the effectiveness of LOE at the tactical level.

The significance of the LOE at achieving unity of effort with JIIM partners requires further emphasis in research and evaluation by practitioners. The concept's importance to operational commanders in OIF provided evidence of its utility in complex COIN environments. Integration of a significant number of diverse partners in military operations is the norm, not the exception. It is

imperative that military practitioners understand the lessons of history and value of doctrinal concepts that help them create viable partnerships.

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